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Can an Economic Approach Solve the
High-Level Nuclear Waste Problem?
Herbert Inhaber*
Introduction
With the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of
1982,1 Congress and the Administration thought it had solved, once
and for all, the long-festering debate on what to do with high-level
radioactive waste (HLRW) from the nation's civilian nuclear reactors.
The fact that no national solution had been available prior to this had
been used effectively by anti-nuclear forces to criticize both the industry
and the technology. Many in the industry breathed a sigh of relief as
President Reagan signed the legislation.
Within a short time, what was thought to be a "final solution" turned
out to have vastly different characteristics. One of the major purposes of
the legislation was to remove the process of finding a final resting place
for HLRW from political maneuvering. That is, since it was believed
that no state would, under any conceivable circumstances, volunteer for
the waste repository, a scientific and objective approach to finding the
location was necessary. But political considerations apparently could not
be dismissed by this approach.
For example, the 1982 legislation called on the Department of
Energy (DOE) to pick two sites, one in the eastern U.S. and one in the
West, to assuage fears that one region of the nation would be burdened
* Dr. Inhaber is president of Risk Concepts, Inc. He has performed research on the
siting of waste facilities, the relative risk of energy systems, and other energy-
environment problems. He has three degrees in physics and mathematics, including a
Ph.D. (experimental superconductivity) from the University of Oklahoma.
1 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988).
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with all the wastes. But in 1987, DOE picked three Western sites while
indefinitely postponing a decision on the Eastern site (or sites). 2
Members of Congress from the West accused the Administration, and
particularly the Energy Secretary, John Herrington, of returning politics
once again to the process.
Congress returned to the drawing board, amending the law in late
1987.3 In this new version, only one site was to be characterized, at
Yucca Mountain in Nevada. According to Davis,4 "the investment of
an estimated $1 billion to $2 billion to test-the geological suitability of
the site [was] viewed by most members [of Congress] as a virtual
commitment to put the waste there."
Again, the issue refused to die. The State of Nevada has fought a
series of legal battles to prevent the repository from being sited there.
Even a brief description of these arguments would take many pages.
Also, concerns have been raised in influential national media about the
scientific basis of the geological characterization. 5 It is sufficient to
state that, after more than three years, what was again believed to be a
"final solution" has proven otherwise. Neither the nuclear industry nor
ratepayers who are funding these operations have substantial assurance
that a repository will be built in Nevada or elsewhere.
Is Another Approach Possible?
Fifty years after the problem of disposing of HLRW was first
recognized during the Manhattan Project of World War II, it remains
2 Davis, Panel Adds Nuclear Waste Plan to Budget Reconciliation Plan,
Congressional Quarterly 1724 (Aug. 1, 1987).
3 Davis, Nevada to Get Nuclear Waste; Everyone Else "Off the Hook",
Congressional Quarterly 3136 (Dec. 19, 1987).
4 id.
5 Broad, A Mountain of Trouble, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1990, section 6
(Magazine, at 36).
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unresolved. As a result, observers have suggested that a new approach
is necessary.
Whatever the approach, it must have at least two elements. First,
public health and safety must be preserved by appropriate environmental
regulations. Second, the facility must actually be built. The second point
might seem obvious. But previous approaches spent almost all efforts
on the first, considering that the second would take care of itself. It
wasn't, as the above sorry chronology indicates.
If a volunteer could be found, then all of the squabbling would end.
That approach was suggested by Representative Morris Udall, chairman
of the House Interior Committee and the leader of House efforts to pass
a bill. He said, a few weeks before the 1987 legislation was passed,6
"I think the best way out of here is a voluntary agreement." But at any
point in the last half-century, a volunteer state could have come forward
to accept the wastes. The fact that none has done so over more than a
generation suggests that this is unlikely to occur in the future. That is,
unless some other inducements are added.
Proposed Financial Inducements
These inducements were also considered by Congress. Senator
Bennett Johnston, heading Senatorial efforts to produce a bill, initially
proposed payments of $100 million a year.7 However, at the time of
passage, the amount was diluted to $10 or $20 million annually. The
first amount was to be paid until the facility was completed; the second,
after it was opened for business. 8 There is no indication that Nevada
or any other state would have been or has been mollified by any of the
three amounts.
6 Davis, Super-Swap Possible under Nuclear Waste Bill, Congressional Quarterly
2684 (Oct. 31, 1987).
7 Davis, supra note 3, at 3136.
8 42 U.S.C. § 10173a (1988).
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There are a number of reasons for this. First, there was no provision
in Senator Johnston's original offer or the final legislation that the
effects of inflation would be incorporated in the payment. As a result,
the real value of the payment, whatever its level, would decrease over
time. A 5% decrease annually would make the payment very small over
a generation. Congress would always have the option of increasing the
payment in later years, but there would be no guarantee, from the
viewpoint of the recipient state, of that occurring.
Second, payments on a continuous basis, as enshrined in the 1987
amendments, imply a smaller "present value" than receiving the payment
or payments up front. Almost all elementary economics texts
demonstrate the simple fact that a payment now can be put in the bank to
draw interest, whereas a payment 10, 20 or 50 years in the future will
not draw interest until it is made.9
The present value of payments made over time will depend on
expected interest rates. If we assume (a) $10 million is paid annually to
a recipient state for 20 years as the repository is being built; (b) $20
million annually is paid for the next 50 years, then the total payments
would total $1.2 billion, a substantial sum. But if we also assume a
typical interest rate of about 8%, it can be shown that the present value
of these payments is about $150 million, substantially less. While there
is no indication that calculations of present value influenced Nevada
representatives to reject the federal offer, the concept could not have
been completely out of mind.
Financial Negotiations do not Work
As far as is known, there were no negotiations between Nevada and
Congressional leaders about the precise benefits amounts. While
observers10 have called for negotiations between siting bodies and
9 See, e.g., J. BARRON & G. LYNCH, EcoNoMics 149 (2d ed. 1989).
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potential host communities, these give-and-take discussions may not be
possible in the overheated climate of HLRW.
Further, the benefits do not offer a sufficient inducement to Nevada,
whatever their present value. For example, Nevada had revenues of
'about $2.4 billion in 1986.11 The $10 million annually would be about
0.4% of the state's revenues. That proportion would almost certainly
decrease in later years, as the state's revenues increased but the
payments remained constant.
Total federal payments to Nevada (state and local) were $394 million
in 1987.12 Annual payments of $10 million would be about 2.5% of
total existing federal payments; $20 million would be about 5.1%.
The level of payments can be. considered from a family's viewpoint.
Suppose that its income was about $25,000, a typical level in recent
years. The federal government is, in effect, saying to this family:
We propose to build a facility in your back yard that
everyone else in town has rejected, for various reasons. We
propose to pay you $100 annually for the right to build this.
After it's completed, we will pay $200. The amounts are
fixed by law.
The payments of $100 correspond to 0.4% of this hypothetical
family's income; $200 corresponds to 0.8%. These are the fractions of
Nevada's revenues to which the $10 or $20 million annual payments
correspond. It is little surprise that, regardless of the merits of the other
arguments in the case, Nevada paid little heed to the financial
inducements.
10 See, e.g., Shrader-Frechette, Perceived Risks Versus Actual Risks: Managing
Hazards Through Negotiation, I RISK: IssuEs IN HEALTH AND SAFETY 341 (Fall
1990).
11 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 278 (1989).
12 Id. at271.
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Other Inducements
It is possible to offer inducements for accepting LULUs (locally
unwanted land uses) other than direct payments. One idea floated at the
time of the debates was to offer the recipient state a major federal
facility, like the superconducting supercollider, the proposed world's
largest particle accelerator. According to Representative Philip Sharp,
'That has been the subject of a facetious joke around the committee here
- that if you take the repository, you get the supercollider. In theory,
there might be something worked out." In reality, he said, it is "highly
unlikely." 13
Although the concept of trading a benefit for a detriment was treated
jocularly by some members of Congress, it eventually found its way
into legislation. 14 The relevant clause reads: "The Secretary [of
Energy], in siting federal research projects, shall give special
consideration to proposals from States where a repository is sited." In
principle, this section is the solution to all problems of siting HLRW.
The state selected receives substantial federal funds, as research
laboratory after research laboratory, with accompanying highly-paid
personnel, is located there. However, this is not what took place. This
clause, for all practical purposes, has remained a dead letter.
There were a number of explanations. First, with regard to the
phrase "where a repository is sited," DOE has argued strenuously that
Nevada has not been sited for a repository, but that only characterization
activities are mandated by law. Therefore, there is no reason to give
special consideration to Nevada until the final decision is made.
Second, the section applies only to activities of the DOE, not the rest
of the federal government. DOE spending on research is only a small
fraction of total federal expenditures. If the clause had specified future
13 Supra note 6.
14 42 U.S.C. § 10174 (1988).
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research facilities of the Department of Defense, National Institutes of
Health and others, a potential repository state might have paid some
attention.
Third, as far as is known, no specific regulations were drawn up to
implement this section of the law. Without these regulations, there was
no mechanism for the Secretary to carry the law into practice, assuming
this was his wish. For example, in a ranking of a proposed research
facility on a scale of 0 to 100, Nevada might have been given 5 or 10
"bonus" points under this section.
As a result, when sites for the superconducting supercollider were
being evaluated, there was no indication that Nevada received any
special consideration in its site selection. Nevada did not make the
"short list" of eight contenders, for example.
Risk and Siting
The question of risk came up only tangentially in the Congressional.
debate of 1987. Nevada representatives claimed that the risk was or
could be high, whereas members from other states generally dismissed
these concerns. Yet the fear that many have of HLRW underlies the fact
that no state has ever volunteered for these wastes, and none is likely to
do so under the current siting mechanism.
Yet if the right mechanism were selected, potential hosts would be
motivated to learn more about the risks of HLRW, generally believed by
DOE experts to be small. As Cross 15 notes, "people who are motivated
to learn are more likely to be better informed than people who are merely
serving time in class." At present, the people of Nevada (or any other
potential repository state) have little or no motivation to learn about risk
or hazards. The strategy they have adopted is to reject virtually all
overtures of the federal government, delaying the characterization as
long as possible.
15 p. CRoss,AuDurTsAs LEARNRS 43 (1981).
2 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 341 UFall 19911
A valid siting mechanism would provide incentives for potential
hosts to understand risk. The mechanism should not be a system for
convincing hosts that risks are small. This has been attempted in many
public meetings, 16 with much more heat than light generated. The
eventual mechanism should allow citizens to make up their minds on
risk, as they do every day on many other public issues.
Possible Market-Based Siting Mechanisms
We have outlined a number of deficiencies in the present system.
But what should a valid and effective siting mechanism look like? The
rest of this paper will describe this, and suggest how it might be fitted
into existing mechanisms of the NWPA, as amended.
Three major principles might be employed. First, the process should
be voluntary. Second, true social compensation for damages, real or
perceived, must be paid. Third, the facility or repository must be built.
The first principle seems, at a glance, to defeat the third. If
volunteers were readily available, the siting process would not have
inspired heated debates on Capitol Hill and a plethora of lawsuits. But
the second principle, that of true social compensation, can be used to
eliminate the incompatibility between the first and third principles.
The principles of voluntarism are nothing new. In Canada, a major
task force on siting low-level radioactive waste17 has stated that it will
consider only volunteer communities for potential disposal sites. In the
16 A meeting on a proposed incinerator in Massachusetts was telecast on Living
Against the Odds (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 3, 1991) (Cassette available from
Films for the Humanities, Princeton, NJ.). Members of the audience denounced the
siting commission in vigorous terms, calling them unpleasant names. Without the
presence of armed police, there is a likelihood that violence would have broken out. If
there was any calm discussion of the risks generated by the proposed incinerator, it
was not recorded.
17 SITING PROCESS TASK FORCE ON Low-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL,
OPTING FOR COOPERATION (Undated; ISBN 0-662-15759-1).
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U.S. and many other countries, there is no draft for military forces.
Volunteers subject themselves to possibly the greatest risk of all
death in battle. Yet volunteers are found.
The problem of finding the correct compensation to be paid has been
a difficult one. Its difficulty lies in the divergence between what
economists call "willingness-to-pay" and "willingness-to-accept." For
example, a citizen, when asked how much she would be willing to pay
to have a LULU located far from her home, might respond in terms of
tens or at most hundreds of dollars. When asked how much she would
ask to have that same.LULU nearby, she might respond with answers in
the millions or billions, or even that no price on earth was high enough.
In recent years, proposals for overcoming this divergence have been
forthcoming. It would take far too much space to discuss them all, but
one of the pioneers has been Michael O'Hare at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard. 18 In a pioneering 1977 work, he
analyzed the bases of the NITMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome, and
suggested possible compensation mechanisms to overcome it.
A second pioneer was Howard Kunreuther 19 of the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania. He has carried the work
forward in recent years, proposing auction systems for noxious
facilities.
Out of these and other suggestions has come the concept of the
reverse Dutch auctionsM for HLRW and other LULUs.20 Briefly, the
18 See O'Hare, Not in My Block You Don't: Facility Siting and the Strategic
Importance of Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'Y 407 (1977); M. O'HARE, L. BACOW &
D. SANDERSON, FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION (1978); and O'Hare &
Sanderson, Fair Compensation and the Boomtown Problem, 14 URB. L. ANN. 101
(1978).
19 See Kunreuther, Kleindorfer, Knez & Yaksick, A Compensation Mechanism
for Siting Noxious Facilities: Theory and Experimental Design, 14 J. ENVTL.
ECON. AND MGMT. 371 (1987); Kunreuther & Kleindorfer, A Sealed-Bid Auction
Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 295 (1986).
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auction would have a rising price, set by the siting authority. No state
would be required to bid, removing the element of coercion that
potential host states and communities have felt was inextricable from the
present siting system. As the price rose, citizens within various states
would take a close look at the hazards and benefits of the proposed
repository. The auction would have a quasi-deadline, analogous to the
deadline that ensures that most labor-management negotiations conclude
with an agreement. The deadline would not be artificially imposed, but
lie in the fact that if a state waited too long before making a bid, it would
not receive the bonus. There would be no incentive to delay indefinitely,
as there is now.
Can the Reverse Dutch Auction fit into the NWPA?
If the reverse Dutch auction does have components superior to the
present system, does the NWPA have to be abandoned? Not
necessarily. The rest of this paper will briefly discuss how these newer
concepts can be fitted into the older, command-and-control framework
of the NWPA.
The NWPA is a complex document. In its original version, it
spanned just under .80 pages of closely-spaced type. When it was
amended in 1987, four subtitles (to the original Title I) and two
completely new titles were added. Obviously, there is no mention of the
reverse Dutch auction or other novel siting systems.
The main changes in 1987, in terms of an auction concept, were
threefold. First, Yucca Mountain in Nevada was chosen for intensive
20 The outline of the concept was discussed in Inhaber, Triple Obstacles to Power
Generation: Risk, Greenhouse Effect and Nuclear Wastes, in POWER GENERATION
TECHNOLOGY 15 (1989). Other publications are Inhaber, Solving the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Puzzle, 17 Empire State Report 41 (Jul. 1990); Inhaber, Hands
up for Toxic Waste, 347 Nature 611 (Oct. 18, 1990); Inhaber, How to Solve the
Problem of Siting Nuclear Wastes, 62 TRANSACTIONS AM. NUCLEAR SoC'Y 61
(1990); Inhaber, Solving the Problem of Toxic and Nuclear Waste Disposal, 41 J.
AIAND WAsm MaV1T. A. 808 (1991).
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investigation. All reference to other potential sites was abandoned.
Second, a nuclear waste negotiator was specified. This negotiator,
David Leroy of Idaho, has been confirmed by the Senate.2 1 Third, a
level of "benefits" was specified, as noted above. The 1982 legislation
had no such provision, confining itself only to payments for a state to
conduct environmental or sociological studies. The fact that payments of
any type in addition to those for strictly "scientific" purposes were
specified was itself a precedent
The Nuclear Waste Negotiator
According to the revised legislation,22 the negotiator
shall attempt to find a State or Indian tribe willing to host a
repository... at a technically qualified site on reasonable
terms and shall negotiate with any state or Indian tribe which
expresses an interest in hosting a repository....
From the viewpoint of the reverse Dutch auction, the negotiator has
considerable leeway in finding this volunteer. No specific method is
prescribed for him to accomplish his task. As a result, he is not
specifically prohibited from any specific method.
The phrase "reasonable terms" also does not preclude an auction.
The funding for the present system is supplied by the nuclear industry.
If the negotiator could find a volunteer via the reverse Dutch auction, the
bonus amount would be approved by relevant courts as within executive
discretion, assuming that legal action were taken.
One of the major problems the negotiator faces is not so much
developing new approaches to siting, but that, to some extent, his work
conflicts with the rest of NWPA. The body of the legislation
concentrates on Yucca Mountain. Yet the negotiator is expected to find
21 Negotiator Nominee Leroy Confirmed by Senate, 33 NUCLEAR NEWS 97 (Sept.
1990).
22 42 U.S.C. § 10242 (b)(2) (1988).
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another site. The text makes a provision23 for that possibility, allowing
the name of a potential volunteer state to be substituted for Yucca
Mountain whenever it appears.
The exact terms the negotiator will offer are diffuse enough to allow
an auction to be held. He is to offer "reasonable and appropriate" terms
that "contain such provisions as are necessary to preserve any right to
participation or compensation of such State."24
Nuclear Waste Fund
If an auction is to be held, there must be a provision for the source
of funds. This is already part of the NWPA. 25
The Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF) collects one mill (a tenth of a cent)
per kilowatt-hour from all nuclear power plants to pay for the entire
storage and repository system. If a 100-watt light bulb powered by
nuclear-derived electricity were burned continuously for a month (720
hours), at the average national rate of about 80 per kilowatt-hour, the
total bill would be $5.76. Of that, 70 would go to the NWF.
One of the problems of the fund from the nuclear industry's
viewpoint is that, while it continues to make payments, it has no
guarantee that a repository will ever be built. The reverse Dutch auction
makes a firm connection between payment and construction. No funds
change hands unless a volunteer with an acceptable site comes forward.
One possible objection to an auction mechanism is that, because of
its nature, the size of the bonus cannot be specified in advance. While
the NWPA specifies an annual payment that was obviously not agreed
to by Nevada, at least it was specific. The same claim cannot be made in
advance about any auction.
23 42 U.S.C. § 10245 (a) (1988).
24 42 U.S.C. § 10243 (d)(2) (1988).
25 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (1988).
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Some data have recently been derived that shed some light on the
amount that electricity ratepayers would be willing to expend to keep
LULUs out of their back yard. Hubbard,26 using data collected by the
Bonneville Power Administration, finds that consumers in the Pacific
Northwest would each pay $13.30 annually to keep a nuclear plant
somewhere else, about $13 to avoid a fossil-fueled plant, and $6 to
avoid a hydro dam. Polls have shown that a HLRW repository is
regarded as much more dangerous than these facilities, so the amounts
consumers would pay to avoid having one of these facilities nearby
presumably would be even greater. It does not take much arithmetic to
realize that the funds that could be raised with the guarantee that the
repository will not be located adjacent to communities that contribute to
the bonus could be enormous.
Can these funds be raised without going back to Congress to amend
the law? The NWPA has a provision2 7 that permits the Secretary of
Energy to alter the rate charged by the nuclear levy on 90 days' notice.
His changes go into effect if neither house of Congress disapproves
within three months.
So the concern that the Administration would have to ask for
alterations in the law to increase a bonus is misplaced. It is usually much
easier for Congress to do nothing than to do something.
Alternative Approaches in NWPA
While, at first reading, the NWPA seems to require a specific
system for siting HLRW, there are clauses that allow for different
approaches. One of them states:2 8 "The Secretary shall undertake a
study with respect to alternative approaches to managing the
26 Hubbard, The Real Cost of Energy, 264 Sc!. AM. 36 (Apr. 1991).
27 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (a)(3) (1988).
28 42 U.S.C. § 10223 (1988).
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construction and operation of all civilian radioactive waste management
facilities...."
Admittedly, the study was performed primarily to determine if a
private corporation could perform the tasks allocated to DOE. While a
report was filed, it seems to have been overlooked in the battles over
siting. Nonetheless, a precedent was set: The Secretary could evaluate
systems other than that set down in NWPA.
Non-Restriction of Payments
If a system of bonuses to a volunteer state is to be effective, that
state must have full control over the funds. In the past, proposed
payments to states or communities often had strings attached. A fixed
proportion or amount was to be spent on new roads, another proportion
on schools, and so on. Because one of the major feelings experienced
by communities in these battles was that of helplessness with respect to
a siting authority, these specifications only heightened those sentiments.
The NWPA dispenses with those rules laid down from on high. It
notes2 9 that the Secretary may not restrict the purposes to which the
payments may be used. The only exception is that at least one-third of
the payments to the state must go to the actual affected locality or
county.
Of course, as noted above, the fact that the benefit package was
specified by Congress rather than the state perpetuates the "Father
knows best" attitude. The reverse Dutch auction allows the state to set
its own value on accepting the repository, rather than having the federal
government perform that task. It sets the true social cost of the facility, a
cost which cannot be determined by other means such as polls. Still, the
fact that states will be allowed to use benefits in any way they see fit
makes the NWPA a precedent-setter in this area.
29 42 US.C. § 10173a (a)(6) (1988).
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Summary
In this brief overview of the NWPA, some of its desirable and
undesirable features in the light of a bonus or auction system have been
described. The 1987 amendments broke new ground in that, for the first
time, Congress offered benefits above and beyond direct costs to the
state to perform studies. However, those benefits were rigidly
prescribed. There was no flexibility to take account of differing views
among states towards the repository.
While the NWPA seems to prescribe an unbending approach toward
siting, there are a number of clauses which provide some malleability.
In particular, the Nuclear Waste Negotiator apparently has much more
leeway than does the Secretary of Energy. Whether or not that will
provoke conflict between the two offices is unclear.
It is clear, after so many years of battles over siting of HLRW, that
the present "decide, announce and defend" (DAD) system has produced
much heat but little light. The nuclear industry, already finding it
difficult to build new reactors partly because of concerns about costs,
has to pay a tax for which it may never reap a return in the way of a
repository.
Also, valid concerns about risks and hazards tend to be lost in the
legal battles in Congress and between Nevada and the Administration.
While many risk analyses of various types have been performed on the
subject of HLRW, they are often used by one side or the other as tools
of attack, rather than scientific documents.
Some have contended that so much work and effort have already
gone into the NWPA that it simply cannot be abandoned, regardless of
how many of its flaws become apparent. In response, I would contend
that the situation is analogous to a monkey reaching inside a narrow-
necked jar and grasping something. With his fist clenched, he cannot
withdraw his hand, and he refuses to let go. A stalemate is reached.
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If the monkey were wiser, he would let go and upset the jar to
disgorge its contents. It remains to be seen if that wisdom will be
displayed in the decades-long battle over high-level nuclear waste sites.
